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THE SOC IOECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF THE
SHIFTA CONFL ICT IN KENYA , c .     –  *
BY HANNAH ALICE WHITTAKER
SOAS, University of London
ABSTRACT: Using a set of oral testimonies, together with military, intelligence,
and administrative reports from the s, this article re-examines the shifta
conflict in Kenya. The article moves away from mono-causal, nationalistic
interpretations of the event, to focus instead on the underlying socioeconomic
dynamics and domestic implications of the conflict. It argues that the nationalist
interpretation fails to capture the diversity of participation in shifta, which was not
simply made up of militant Somali nationalists, and that it fails to acknowledge the
significance of an internal Kenyan conflict between a newly independent state in the
process of nation building, and a group of ‘dissident’ frontier communities that
were seen to defy the new order. Examination of this conflict provides insights into
the operation of the early postcolonial Kenyan state.
KEY WORDS: Kenya, Somalia, war, postcolonial.
ON  December , a State of Emergency was declared in Kenya’s North
Eastern Region (NER). The declaration came just over two weeks after Kenya
gained independence, and represented the first serious challenge to the
integrity and stability of the new state. At issue was the status of the area
known during British administration as the Northern Frontier District
(NFD). This region was comprised of six districts, Garissa, Isiolo, Mandera,
Marsabit, Moyale, and Wajir that were inhabited almost entirely by the
pastoral Somali, Boran, Gabra, and Rendille. From , when the British
were preparing to leave Kenya, these groups formed a political alliance (with
the exception of a small minority of Boran, and the Gabra and Burji from
Marsabit district) under the banner of the Northern Province Progressive
Peoples Party (NPPPP) to campaign for secession of the NFD from Kenya to
the Somali Republic.
The movement for secession in the NFD developed from the experience of
colonial rule in northern Kenya. Due to sectional conflict between the
resident communities, and a lack of exploitable resources, the area was
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 Command Paper , Kenya: Report of the Northern Frontier District Commission
(London, ), ; N. Mburu, Bandits on the Border: The Last Frontier in the Search for
Somali Unity (Trenton, NJ, ), .
 The Boran were divided over the issue of secession, a division that reflected religious
affiliation. The Boran of Marsabit district were Christian whereas, and in common with
the Somali, the Boran of Isiolo district were Muslim.
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considered a ‘closed district’ by the British and administered as a separate
entity within Kenya. At the same time, the porous and ill-policed border
between the NFD and the Somali Republic reinforced existing relationships
between the communities that straddled the peripheries of both states that
were of much greater significance. This enabled political leaders in the NFD
to rally people behind a campaign for secession, which played on feelings of
cultural and economic isolation that were common to all inhabitants. The
demand for NFD secession was supported by the government of the Somali
Republic, which was also campaigning for the creation of a ‘Greater Somali’
state, the unification of all Somali inhabited territories across the Horn of
Africa. The inclusion of NFD representatives by the British in the political
negotiations that led to Kenyan independence appeared to give official
recognition to the prospect of secession, and suggests that there was a
legitimate case to be addressed. However, by the time that Kenya gained
independence on  December , a British alliance with the Kenya
African National Union (KANU), which formed Kenya’s first government
and which resisted territorial adjustment, resulted in the incorporation of the
NFD within independent Kenya. In protest, on the night of the th, there
were a series of violent attacks on police posts and administrative camps in
Kenya’s northern regions by radicalised members of the NPPPP. This
marked the beginning of the so-called shifta (bandit or rebel) conflict, which
lasted until November . It should be noted that in the British and
Kenyan archives, the shifta conflict is referred to interchangeably as the ‘NFD
dispute’ or ‘Somali question’. Use of the term ‘shifta conflict’ has been
applied retrospectively due to the labeling of participants in the conflict as
shifta by the Kenyan government.
The historiography of the shifta conflict is dominated by a relatively small
body of literature that puts Somali nationalism at the centre of analysis.
Critical attention has been focused on the links between violent insurgency in
northern Kenya, and the broader aims of Somali nationalism at this time.
This scholarship argues that participants in the shifta conflict were inspired
by the idea of a ‘Greater Somalia’ and, thus, from this perspective, shiftawas a
movement of militant Somali nationalism; the only published monograph
dedicated to the shifta conflict focuses on factors that gave rise to militant
Somali nationalism. Nene Mburu highlights discriminatory colonial legis-
lation as the cause of the Somali ethnic community’s disaffection with Kenya
which, combined with Somali nationalism emanating from the Somali
Republic, provided a motive for secession. Mburu’s conclusion is that the
shifta struggle failed because those involved allowed the Somali Republic to
run the campaign from , and so compromised its credibility and lost
internal cohesion.
 K.G. Adar, Kenyan Foreign Policy Behavior Towards Somalia, – (Lanham,
MD, ), .
 See S. Touval, Somali Nationalism: International Politics and the Drive for Unity in the
Horn of Africa (Cambridge, MA, ); J. Markakis, National and Class Conflict in the
Horn of Africa (London, ); M. I. Farah, From Ethnic Response to Clan Identity: A
Study of State Penetration among the Somali Nomadic Pastoral Society of Northeastern
Kenya (Uppsala, Sweden, ); Adar, Kenyan; Mburu, Bandits.
 See Mburu, Bandits.
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Taking as its point of departure Mburu’s conclusions regarding the
conduct of guerrilla insurgency in northern Kenya, this article reconsiders
the legacy of the Somali nation-building programme for understanding the
events of the shifta conflict. It does so for two reasons. First, recent research
into the political economy of intrastate armed conflict has dispensed with
singular explanations for understanding individual participation, and
emphasises the role of multiple economic, political, cultural, and strategic
factors. During the shifta conflict, Somali identity was only one of a number
of possible reasons to join the insurgency. Second, those historians who have
provided nationalistic interpretations of the conflict have focused their
analyses almost exclusively on the activities of Somali insurgents. In doing
so, they overlook the participation of Boran and Rendille groups in shifta.
These groups share a long history of conflict and competition, as well as
collaboration and interdependence, with the Somali over access to scarce
water and pasture resources.To see the violence of the shifta conflict solely in
terms of a nationalist struggle ignores other dynamics that were at work
within the NFD during the conflict period, namely clan and sectional rivalry.
The militarisation of northern Kenya after , therefore needs to be
understood in relation to on-going resource struggles between these various
communities living on the periphery of the Kenyan state, and in relation to
the experience of violence following the outbreak of the insurgency, as well as
in relation to Somali nationalism. Shifta combined militant secessionists with
a nationalist agenda and more narrowly-based groups that sought the
protection or aggrandisement of their individual clan sections through access
to firearms that being shifta provided, and used the Kenya-Somalia border as
a resource in pursuit of those interests. As such, to borrow the metaphor
Daniel Branch has used to describe the interweaving of anti-colonial and civil
war violence during the Mau Mau rebellion, the shifta conflict is best
conceptualised as a helix, where strands of a nationalist insurgency
intertwined with local-level resource conflict.
 M. Berdal, ‘Beyond greed and grievance – and not too soon . . .’, Review of
International Studies, : (), .
 See Markakis, National; Farah, From Ethnic Response; Mburu, Bandits; D. Branch,
Kenya: Between Hope and Despair, – (New Haven, CT, ).
 G. Schlee, Identities on the Move: Clanship and Pastoralism in Northern Kenya
(Manchester, ); G. Schlee, ‘Gada systems on the meta-ethnic level: Gabra/Boran/
Garre interactions in the Kenya-Ethiopian borderland’, in E. Kurimoto and S. Simose
(eds.), Conflict, Age and Power in North East Africa: Age Systems in Transition (Oxford,
), –; G. Schlee, ‘Brothers of the Boran once again: on the fading popularity of
certain Somali identities in northern Kenya’, Journal of Eastern African Studies, :
(), –. See also G. Oba, ‘Shifting identities along resource borders: becoming and
continuing to be Boorana Oromo’, in P. T.W. Baxter, J. Hultin, and A. Triulzi (eds.),
Being and Becoming Oromo: Historical and Anthropological Enquiries (Lawrenceville, NJ,
), –; H.W. Arero, ‘Coming to Kenya: imagining and perceiving a nation among
the Borana of Kenya’, Journal of Eastern African Studies, : (), –.
 The conceptualisation of the border as a resource is drawn from D. Feyissa
and M. V. Hoehne (eds.), Borders and Borderlands as Resources in the Horn of Africa
(Rochester, NY, ).
 D. Branch, Defeating Mau Mau, Creating Kenya: Counterinsurgency, Civil War, and
Decolonization (Cambridge, ), .
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A more nuanced discussion of shifta motivations allows for a better
understanding of the Kenyan government’s responses to the conflict. It also
provides new insights into the development of the early postcolonial Kenyan
state, and the ways in which the colonial experience defined Kenya’s
postcolonial ‘governmentality’, particularly in relation to dealing with
populations deemed problematic. The independent Kenyan government’s
counter-shifta strategy was grounded in experiences gained during the Mau
Mau rebellion. Scholarship on decolonisation in Kenya has already
documented that independence did not entail significant ideological or
structural breaks in state policies. Examination of the shifta conflict reveals
additional continuities between the colonial and postcolonial state, and
demonstrates how those policies contributed to the long-term decline of
pastoralism across the Horn of Africa.
T H E SH I F TA
Self-styled as the Northern Frontier District Liberation Front (NFDLF),
those who took up arms in northern Kenya during the s were referred to
as shifta. Originally derived from the Amharic expression for banditry, the
term has been used to describe nineteenth-century Ethiopian noblemen with
political aspirations, and twentieth-century Ethiopian nationalists in Eritrea
who used banditry as a method of political protest. More broadly across
eastern Africa, shifta is used to denote a bandit or rebel. In Kenya it has
most frequently been applied to criminal bandit gangs engaged in livestock
raiding and poaching. In relation to the movement for secession, the term
was first applied by the Kenyan government in November . Jomo
Kenyatta, then Kenya’s prime minister, referred to those who engaged in
violence against the Kenyan government as ‘hooligans or armed groups of
youths called shifta. Those people who go raiding here and there.’ Such use
of the term implied that those seeking secession were no more than criminal
bandits. While this categorisation of shifta is important to note for our later
discussion of the Kenyan government’s responses to secessionism, it is also
indicative of the multi-faceted nature of the movement.
Broadly speaking three types of shifta insurgent can be identified. At the
apex of the movement was a leadership group, made up of ‘radical’ members,
committed secessionists who established the NPPPP, and acted as political
spokesmen for the NFD between  and . They were school-educated
 See B. A. Ogot and W. R. Ochieng (eds.), Decolonization and Independence in Kenya,
– (London, ); Branch, Kenya.
 Interview with Deghow Maalim Sambul, Garissa,  Dec. .
 D. Crummey, ‘Banditry and resistance: noble and peasant in nineteenth-century
Ethiopia’, in D. Crummey (ed.), Banditry, Rebellion and Social Protest in Africa (London,
), –; R. Iyob, The Eritrean Struggle for Independence: Domination, Resistance,
Nationalism, – (Cambridge, ), .  Crummey, ‘Banditry’, .
 Kenya National Archive, Nairobi (KNA) BV//, N. Cossins, ‘North East
Province Kenya: A study of its pastoral Somali’ (Aug. ), –; Interview with Abdo
Barre, Garissa,  Dec. ; Interview with Gufu Arero and Fugich Dabassa, Isiolo, 
Oct. .
 Hansard, Republic of Kenya, House of Representatives Official Report Volume I (Part
II),  July- November , (Nairobi,  Nov. ), Cols. –.
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men and often from wealthy lineages who wielded significant influence within
their communities. They were able to establish personal commands at shifta
base camps in the Somali Republic, from where they negotiated for arms with
Somali officials, and organised the recruitment and training of secondary
members.
Directly beneath this leadership was a small cadre of individuals who led
local shifta groups made up of rank-and-file members. Although these group
leaders were not prominent figures in the NPPPP, most had joined the party
at the local branch level, and were involved in the political rallies and
demonstrations that preceded the outbreak of the insurgency. They were
often defectors from the administration police, or the sons of former colonial
chiefs. Like their commanders above them, these men had been exposed to
some form of schooling, offered organisational skills, and, in most cases, had
some experience in handling guns. It is these two top tiers of shifta that we
can consider as the NFDLF.
The majority of the shifta, however, were ‘light lads’ or ‘the youth’; men
aged between  and  who engaged in livestock keeping and had little or no
formal schooling. They were recruited into the movement and were
subsequently taught how to use guns, grenades, and later landmines. Data
gathered from interviews reveals them to be a diverse mix of individuals, who
today express varying levels of commitment to the movement’s stated aim of
secession. It is possible that there has been a rejection of secessionist
aspirations in northern Kenya because the Kenyan government has now
established some authority in the region, and because state collapse in the
Somali Republic has made Somali unification not only undesirable but also
unworkable. Nonetheless, while some former shifta state that they were
attracted to the rhetoric of the ‘liberation struggle’, others were only
marginally aware of the broader political context of the conflict at the
time. For some recruits, becoming shifta was less about the fight for
the liberation of the NFD and more about respecting the traditional role of
the youth or ‘warrior’ within the community. One Somali Ajuran shifta
fighter explained quite simply that ‘if a community goes to war then it is the
youth who fight’. Similarly, some who became shifta after the outbreak of
 Interview with Adan Wako Bonaya, Nairobi,  Dec. .
 Interview with Fatuma Gabow, Garissa,  Dec. . Her husband defected from
the administration police to become a shifta group leader; Interview with Wario Tadicha,
Isiolo,  Oct. , the son of a Boran chief and the brother of an active shifta leader.
 Interview with Dahir Hajj, Isiolo,  Oct. ; Interview with Jillo Golicha, Garba
Tulla,  Dec. .
 Interview with Iftin Hussein, Garissa,  Dec. ; Interview with Boku Jirma,
Garba Tulla,  Dec. .
 KNA District Commissioner (DC)/Isiolo (ISO)///, Garba Tulla to Isiolo,
Ref. EN./,  Nov. ; Interview with Waqo Bagajo, Isiolo,  Oct. .
 A total of  individuals were interviewed from Nairobi and from Marsabit, Isiolo,
Garba Tulla, and Garissa within the contested area. They represent an eclectic mix of
informants including former shifta insurgents and male and female civilian residents who
lived in the area during the conflict period. To protect the identity of some of the
interviewees, pseudonyms have been used.
 Arero’s comments, Interview with Gufu Arero and Fugich Dabassa; Interview with
Guyatu Boru, Garba Tulla,  Dec. .
 Interview with Farah Mohamed, Garba Tulla,  Dec. .
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the insurgency say that one of the reasons they did so was the violence that
this created – this was the case with three Boran members of shifta from Isiolo
district, who claimed that they joined the movement in reaction to Kenyan
counterinsurgency operations, because of the ‘bullets that the Kenyan
government sprayed on us [the Boran]’.
Another common explanation given for why people became shifta was the
‘threat’ of the shifta itself. While the operation of the pastoral economy in
northern Kenya is determined by the ability of individual sections to
effectively occupy areas where water and pasture exist, as arms became
available to those willing to form shifta groups they could be used not only
against the Kenyan government in pursuance of secession, but also to make
gains in territory at a neighbour’s expense. For instance, in Mandera district,
rather than unite as one group, chiefs of the Mandera Degodia, Gurreh, and
Murille all went to the Somali Republic independently to negotiate for arms
on the understanding that they would form their own shifta groups. As
shown below, these arms were then used in a series of raids and counter-raids
between the Degodia and Gurreh by ‘shifta gangs’. Likewise, in the Waso
area of Isiolo, Boran, who joined the shifta after the start of the conflict, stated
explicitly that once the Somali had access to guns, the Boran also needed
guns. The only way they could obtain guns was by going to the Somali
Republic and joining the shifta. Becoming shifta presented the Isiolo-based
Boran with an opportunity to prevent the continued Somali encroachment
into Boran lands, through which the Somali accessed the NFD.
The loose organisation of the shifta also presented individuals with the
opportunity to mould the movement for secession as their own. First, the
shifta were divided between two base camps located in the Somali Republic,
reflecting clan cleavages. Horizontal bonds of affiliation rather than loyalty
to a central command or person determined authority over individual groups.
Representatives of the Somali government met and dealt individually with
the leaders of each clan section. Second, each shifta group was a discrete
formation. Titles such as captain or lieutenant gave the appearance of an
organised chain of command. Yet, these titles were adopted by individuals
and groups and were not centrally designated.
Finally, local circumstance and local interests can also help to explain non-
participation in shifta. For instance, although the Boran of Isiolo became
shifta, the Boran of Marsabit district did not. Marsabit was at the centre of
political opposition to secession in the NFD, and was home to the Northern
 Interview with AbdubGalgallo and Ali Wario, Garba Tulla, Dec. ; Interview
with Adan Banchalle, Isiolo,  Oct. .
 National Archives, London (NA) Colonial Office (CO) /, government paper,
‘Somali activity in the North East Region: Tabulation of recent trends of events’.
 See KNA BB//, BB//, and BB//, Special Branch Weekly Intelligence
Reports.  Interview with Adan Banchalle.
 NA CO /, government paper, ‘Somali activity in the North East Region:
Tabulation of recent trends of events’.
 For instance during October , Captain Abdullahi Mohamed of the Somali army
met the chief of the Mandera Gurreh at Bur Hache, Degodia leaders fromMandera at Bur
Hache, and then the chief of the Murille to negotiate over resources independently of each
other. NA CO /, government paper, ‘Somali activity in the North East Region:
Tabulation of recent trends of events’.  Interview with Farah Mohamed.
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Province United Association (NPUA), which united Marsabit-based Boran,
Burji, and Gabra groups. These were all minority communities in the NFD,
who were not Muslim. During the run up to independence, NPUA
complained to the Kenya administration about employment preferences
being given to Somalis. Their decision to campaign against secession was
largely an effort to safeguard and entrench their minority interests,
particularly their control over local trade, at the expense of the Somalis.
The marginalisation of Somali families within Marsabit Town during the
conflict, which included a general boycott of Somali shops and a refusal to sell
them milk, enabled Burji, Boran, and Gabra individuals to enter into the
livestock and retail trade, which they still dominate today. While the local
interests of the Isiolo Boran were best served through an alliance with shifta,
those of the Marsabit Boran were not.
T H E SH I F TA CON F L I C T , C .     – 
The following reconstruction of the shifta conflict is based on the premise that
there are two languages of conflict, archival and oral, that can be applied to
northern Kenya in the period  to . In the language of the archives,
which details the official interpretation of events, the term ‘shifta’ refers to all
forms of violent conflict occurring in northern Kenya during the s.
Documents describe ‘groups of shifta’ or ‘shifta tribesmen’, who engage in
activities such as ‘ambush’, ‘rifle and grenade fire’, ‘abduction’, ‘raiding’, and
‘cattle raiding’. Interviewees also used the term shifta to refer to those
engaged in insurgency activity against the Kenyan government. However,
interviewees did not always describe ‘raiding’ and ‘cattle raiding’ as being part
of the shifta insurgency, even though shifta groups staged cattle raids in order
to draw Kenyan security forces into a confrontation. In reflection of the
multiple pressures that pushed people to become shifta, some interviewees
described raiding in terms of conflicts between clan sections. One Gabra
informant described how Boran groups from Ethiopia moved through
northern Kenya during the shifta conflict, and on numerous occasions raided
the Rendille in Marsabit district. The Gabra and Rendille competed for
territory in this area, and so the Gabra joined with the Ethiopian Boran
during these raids. This began a series of what the interviewee termed
‘routine’ raids between the Gabra and Rendille. Numerous other
interviewees related similar accounts involving various Somali and Boran
sections. The distinction between sectional raiding and the shifta
 For an example see KNA BB//, Secretary of the NPUA to Provincial
Commissioner Northern Province, ‘Unsatisfied action of Kenya police in Marsabit’, 
Apr. .
 KNA BB//, Special Branch Weekly Intelligence Report No. /, –
Sep. , and Report No. /,  Oct.– Nov. ; Interview with Hirbo Galawe,
Marsabit,  Sept. .
 These descriptive terms have been drawn as examples, and can be found in various
administrative, intelligence, and security reports at the KNA.
 Interview with Jattani Adano, Marsabit,  Sept. .
 Interview with Farhia Mohamed, Isiolo,  Oct. ; Interview with Bashir Dere,
Isiolo, Oct. ; Interviews with Fugich Dabassa, Dahir Hajj, Gufu Arero, and Fatuma
Gabow.
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insurgency is by no means definitive. Nonetheless, the subsequent attempts
by some northern Kenyans to categorise violence shows that the shifta
insurgency fed into and criss-crossed with other local struggles.
Nationalist insurgent activity was characterised by ambushes of police and
army camps, foot patrols, and vehicle convoys. Such activity featured
prominently during the initial stages of the conflict, through , when
shifta groups ranged from between one and five hundred strong, and used
grenade and rifle fire to attack and raid Kenyan police posts and army camps
from across the Somali border. In mid-, shifta also began operating
outside of the contested districts of the former NFD. By and large, these
operations involved raids for plunder and were conducted in areas of Coast
Province and Meru District. During the latter part of  and into ,
shifta also placed Somali-supplied landmines along strategic trade and supply
routes.
However, this type of shifta activity was not a constant throughout the
conflict period. For one, shifta groups were dependent upon supplies of arms
from the Somali Republic, and these were not always readily available.
Moreover, the intensity of shifta activity in a particular area also depended on
the disposition of the gang stationed there. As the shifta insurgency
progressed, there was a tendency for shifta gangs to engage more and more
in what the authorities regarded as criminal or bandit activity. Shifta bands
were reported to be splitting up and returning to their manyattas (home-
steads) where raids were made for material gain. In June , Kenyan
intelligence analysts distinguished three types of shifta engagement. These
were hit and run ambushes on soft targets by small gangs, ambushes of
convoys by large gangs, and stock raids by armed ‘tribesmen’. By , it
 See KNA BB//, Special Branch Weekly Intelligence Reports, –.
 For instance, on  November , two grenades were thrown and rifles were fired
into Rhamu police post. This was followed three days later by an attack on a General
Service Unit camp at Walmerer. Then on the evening of the November, police posts at
Kolbio and Liboi in Garissa were fired upon with rifles. See KNA BB//, Special
Branch Weekly Intelligence Report No. /.
 On  April , thirty shifta ambushed a party of thirteen ‘Tribal’ and Kenya
policemen near Witu, Coast Province. On the same day ten of the thirty also attacked
nearby Malele village, where they looted houses, stole cattle, and burnt ten huts. In the
course of the attack six Giriama were killed. Similarly, on  June forty shifta attacked
Kathangaeini Village in North Tharaka, Meru District, before raiding Kianjoro market
the following day where twelve people were killed. See KNA BB//, Special Branch
Weekly Intelligence Reports Nos. / and /.
 KNA BB//, ‘Operations against shifta an appreciation and statistics. The fourth
year’, Police Headquarters, Nairobi, Jan. .
 For instance, shifta activity was high during February , after the Somali
Republic received an estimated £ million investment in the Somali army from the
Soviet Union. See Markakis, National, . However, in mid- shifta activity
declined. This coincided with a period of open war between the Somali Republic and
Ethiopia over the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. See I.M. Lewis, A Modern History of the
Somali: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa (Oxford, ), .
 For instance on  June ,  Boran from Isiolo raided a Samburu manyatta. It
was reported that eleven shiftawere involved in the incident where donkeys and cattle were
stolen. Fourteen Samburu were also killed in the course of the attack. See KNA BB//,
Special Branch Weekly Intelligence Report No. /.
 KNA BB//, Special Branch Weekly Intelligence Report No. /.
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was the third form of engagement that dominated shifta activity, making it
increasingly difficult for security forces to differentiate between those
incidents that had origins in ‘tribal’ differences and those that were somehow
related to the secessionist cause. This was a consequence of the fact that the
issue of NFD secession created ‘new’ political groupings, manifest in support
or opposition to the NPPPP, and then later the nationalist insurgency, which
sat atop of already existing relationships.
Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, inter-ethnic and clan
relationships in northern Kenya were determined by competition for scarce
water and pasture resources. At the time of the establishment of British
administrative posts in the NFD, between  and , a long process of
Somali migration into northern Kenya from the Gulf of Aden was still
underway. Not only were various Somali groups competing for occupation
of areas around Wajir and the Uaso Nyiro River, but in doing so they were
also encroaching on already established Boran settlements. A similar set of
circumstances existed in Moyale and along the Daua River, where there was
mutual raiding between the Somali Marehan, Gurreh, Ajuran, and
Degodia. Although provincial and district commissioners were given legal
authority to define grazing boundaries and control movement in  and
, recurrent feuds persisted between the Somali Degodia and Aulihan,
Aulihan and Abd Wak, Degodia and Gurreh, as well as between the Somali
and Boran. When Kenya gained independence, and the civil and military
apparatus of the Kenyan state became focused on combating secessionism, an
opportunity was presented to disregard previously set grazing boundaries.
This gave competing sections an opportunity to capitalise territorially using
guns obtained as shifta.
Between December  and May , the Special Branch reported
numerous incidents of shifta activity in Moyale. However, of these incidents,
only two involved attacks by shifta on Kenyan security forces. The remainder
involved security force members responding to ‘raids’ or ‘stock-raids’ by
armed groups of shifta. These raids involved Somali Ajuran and Boran
 KNA BB//, Special Branch Weekly Intelligence Report No. /.
 Lewis,Modern History, .
 KNA Provincial Commissioner (PC)/NFD//, R. G. Turnbull, ‘The impact on
East Africa of the Somali and Galla’, (), .
 KNA PC/NFD//, R. G. Turnbull, ‘The impact on East Africa of the Somali and
Galla’, (), ; E. R. Turton, ‘The pastoral tribes of northern Kenya, –’
(unpublished PhD thesis, University of London, ), –.
 Command Paper ,Kenya, ; A. A. Castagno, ‘The Somali-Kenyan controversy:
implications for the future’, The Journal of Modern African Studies, : (), ;
P. T. Dalleo, ‘Trade and pastoralism: economic factors in the history of the Somali of
northeastern Kenya, –’ (unpublished PhD thesis, Syracuse University, ),
–.
 For instance, in January , the district commissioner at Garissa complained of the
difficulties he faced keeping ‘tribesmen’ in their areas. KNA DC/ISO///, District
Commissioner Garissa to District Commissioner Isiolo, Reference No. LND.//Vol.II/
(),  Jan. ; Arero’s comments, Interview with Gufu Arero and Fugich Dabassa.
 Interview with Bashir Dere.
 The two attacks that were targeted at the security forces occurred on  June ,
when a Kenya Rifles convoy was ambushed at Funyatta, and in the week ending October
, when an army patrol was fired on at Alangor Abor. KNA BB//, Special Branch
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groups, on the one hand, and Sakuye and Boran groups, on the other.
Likewise in Wajir, Somali Degodia trespassed on Somali Ajuran pastures, a
common cause of tension between the two groups during the colonial period
which was a persistent problem for Kenyan security forces during the
insurgency. Throughout December  and January , the security
forces responded to a series of disputes involving various clan-based shifta
groups. In the space of one two-week period there were three Degodia
attacks on the Ajuran, and two Ajuran attacks on the Degodia. That these
clashes represented a serious conflict of interest at the local level is noted by
the fact that during this time, intelligence records detail no incidents where
offensive actions were taken by shifta against the security forces in Wajir.
Again in Mandera, where there are constant reports of shifta activity
directed at the Kenyan government during  and , by September
 this was replaced by stock raiding between Somali Gurreh and Somali
Degodia ‘shifta gangs’. Between September  and May , Kenyan
security forces dealt with  raids on manyattas while they only suffered one
ambush attempt. Here we can clearly see how shifta activity during the
s reflected long-standing competition for resources. In British adminis-
trative reports from the NFD from the s, Degodia-Gurreh feuding was
constantly noted around four important water points in the district: Melka
Ghersi, Korof Harar, Wangai Dahan, and Takabba. During the period of
the shifta conflict, Melka Ghersi and Wangai Dahan were again at the centre
of Degodia-Gurreh tension. Similar conclusions can be drawn for Isiolo
and Marsabit districts, and in these cases it is possible, based on the
combination of archival and oral sources, to unravel how the broader
movement for secession interacted with already existing territorial disputes.
In , the British reserved the Waso area of Isiolo, which is situated
along the Uaso Nyiro River, for the Boran, in an attempt to curtail Somali
westward expansion through northern Kenya. Somali Abd Wak and Aulihan
sections from neighbouring Garissa and Wajir districts were confined to the
Weekly Intelligence Report No. /; BB//, Special Branch Weekly Intelligence
Report No. /.
 See KNA BB//, Special Branch Weekly Intelligence Reports for May .
 KNA DC/Mandera (MDA)//, P. G. P. D. Fullerton, ‘A note on the Somali
border’,  Oct. .
 KNA PC/Garissa (GRSSA)///, Wajir District Monthly Report for Dec. ;
BB//, Weekly Intelligence Report No. /, and No. /.
 KNA BB//, Special Branch Weekly Intelligence Report No. / and No. /.
 See KNA BB//, Special Branch Weekly Intelligence Reports for the period 
Dec.  to  May .
 From late  and continuing through , ambushes of police convoys and
attacks on police posts were a weekly occurrence in Mandera. See KNA BB//, BB//
, and BB//, Special Branch Weekly Intelligence Reports.
 KNA BB//, Special Branch Weekly Intelligence Reports Nos. / to /.
 In April and September of , March, April, and May of , and June and
October of , Degodia-Gurreh friction was reported. See KNA DC/GRSSA//,
Mandera District Monthly Reports, Apr. , Sep. , Mar. , Apr. , and
May ; PC/GRSSA///, Mandera District Monthly Reports, Jun. and Oct. .
 KNA BB//, Special Branch Weekly Intelligence Reports Nos. / to /.
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east of Isiolo by the so-called ‘Somali-Galla’ line. However, through their
alliance with the Isiolo Boran on the question of NFD secession from ,
Somali groups from neighbouring Garissa and Wajir districts were able to
make use of Boran-reserved grazing areas. As long as the secession issue
united Somali and Boran groups during the run-up to independence, Boran
sections were reluctant to remove the trespassers. But in June , when
Somali radicals assassinated a prominent Boran leader, Senior Chief Hajj
GalmDida (who had defected from the secessionist movement in early ),
older tensions between the two groups resurfaced. In particular, the long-
standing issue of grazing rights came to the fore, and Boran reports of Somali
trespassing to the administration increased. As the shifta conflict pro-
gressed, Kenyan security forces were drawn into an increasing number of
confrontations in the Waso area of Isiolo that involved the Boran, on one side,
and the Somali Degodia or Somali Aulihan of Garissa and Wajir districts, on
the other.
Territorial dispute and displacement was likewise at the centre of tension
between the Boran and Rendille in Marsabit district. Documents report a
series of raids on both Rendille and Boran homesteads during the latter part of
 and first half of , in Karare and Laisamis.The Rendille and Boran
have a long history of tension in Marsabit, and according to Rendille
interviewees, have ‘never lived in harmony’. At the root of this tension is
contested ownership of Karare. Although the Rendille currently occupy the
area, the Boran argue that it is ‘rightfully’ theirs. Colonial records suggest
that Boran sections did previously reside in Karare, but slowly dispersed,
moving either to areas in Moyale or to Marsabit Town after , under
pressure by the district administration, which was keen to reduce grazing
pressure on Marsabit Mountain. The vacated land was then opened up for
occupation by the Rendille. One Rendille from Laisamis explained to me
that by becoming shifta after independence, the Rendille were able to
consolidate their control of Karare using guns they obtained from the Somali
 See Dalleo, ‘Trade’, .
 During early , a flurry of correspondence passed between district offices in
Garissa, Wajir, and Isiolo regarding Abd Wak and Aulihan gangs that were sweeping
through Isiolo. This was considered problematic as it threatened to depasture Garba Tulla
and Madogashe. See KNA DC/ISO///, District Commissioner Garissa to District
Commissioner Isiolo, Telegram No. NP/,  Apr. ; KNA DC/ISO///,
Regional Government Agent Isiolo to Regional Government Agent Wajir, Reference
No. L&O.//,  Aug. .
 See KNA BB//, BB//, and BB//, Special Branch Weekly Intelligence
Reports between –.
 KNADC/ISO///, Isiolo District Monthly Report for Jul. ; KNADC/ISO/
//, District Commissioner Isiolo to District Commissioner Wajir, Reference
No. LO.//,  Mar. ; Interview with Tari Bule, Isiolo,  Oct. .
 See KNA BB//, BB//, and BB//, Special Branch Weekly Intelligence
Reports between –.
 See KNA BB//, Special Branch Weekly Intelligence Reports Nos. / to
/.  Interview with Herkena Bulyar, Marsabit,  Oct. .
 Interview with Guyo Boru, Marsabit,  Sept. .
 KNA PC/GRSSA///, Marsabit District Monthly Report for Aug. .
 Interview with Guyo Boru; Interview with Malich Roba, Marsabit,  Oct. .
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Republic. A Boran informant from Marsabit confirmed this, stating that at
the time of shifta there were two threats, one from the shifta, and the other
from the Rendille who were ‘married’ to the shifta and forced the remaining
Boran in Karare to move ‘closer to town’.
The shifta struggle against the Kenyan government combined with these
local struggles between pastoral communities living on the periphery of the
Kenyan state. The result was a complicated web of violence that was at once
directed at a common enemy (the state), and a reflection of local feuding that
reached back into the unfinished business of the settlement of northernKenya.
While some northernKenyans nowattempt to drawdistinctions between these
struggles, the authorities at the time were not able or willing to do so.
G OV E RNMENT R E S P ON S E S TO CON F L I C T I N NO RTH E RN K ENYA
Broadly speaking, the Kenyan government pursued three lines of policy
following the outbreak of the shifta conflict. One involved diplomatic
engagement with the Somali Republic, in the attempt to reach a political
settlement on the status of the NFD area that was acceptable to both
governments. The second involved military and police action against shifta
and their sympathisers; and the third centred upon an attempt to reach an
accommodation with Kenyan Somalis, through political appeasement and
development projects.
The Kenyan government’s pursuit of diplomacy was inconsistent and
slow. It was not until September , at a meeting of the Organization for
African Unity in Kinshasa, Congo, that progress was made. The meeting was
organised following the election of Mohammed Ibrahim Egal as the Somali
prime minister in June of that year. Egal’s election followed a period of
growing disillusionment among Somalia’s urban elites over the effectiveness
of militancy in pursuit of pan-Somalism. While not abandoning the objective
of Somali unification altogether, Egal sought to replace diplomatic confronta-
tion with Kenya over the NFD issue, with accommodation.At the Kinshasa
meeting, representatives of Kenya and the Somali Republic issued a joint
declaration committing both governments to resolve their outstanding
differences over the NFD. This led to a further meeting, chaired by
Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia at Arusha in Tanzania on  October ,
during which a ‘memorandum of understanding’ was agreed upon. Both
governments pledged to suspend the emergency regulations that were in
operation on both sides of their common border, to re-engage in formal
diplomatic relations, and to encourage economic and trade relations. The
Somali government renounced support for shifta, and abandoned its
irredentist foreign policy with respect to the NFD.
 Interview with Herkena Bulyar.
 Interview with Guyo Boru. The argument is also supported by evidence from an
interview with Abdul Wario, Marsabit,  Oct. .
 For a summary of the three-pronged policy strategy, see NA DO /, Kenya High
Commission Report, Nairobi,  May .
 The trajectory of relations between Kenya and the Somali Republic over the NFD
issue during the period – are detailed by Adar and Mburu. See Adar,Kenyan, chs. 
and ; Mburu, Bandits, ch. .  Adar, Kenyan, ; Mburu, Bandits, .
 Adar, Kenyan, .  Ibid. .  Ibid.
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Without support from the Somali Republic, the prospects for securing the
liberation of the NFD through insurgency were drastically reduced. Former
shifta insurgents argued that without Somali material assistance, military
operations against Kenyan security forces were unfeasible. Nonetheless,
while November  marked the formal or official end to the conflict, there
is evidence to suggest that the insurgency had entered into a period of decline
before the Arusha memorandum. This was the consequence of government
counterinsurgency measures. According to Farah Mohamed, who joined
the shifta fromWajir and who surrendered to the Kenyan government in June
, it was the killing of animals and relatives in government villages that
made shifta return to civilian life: ‘Everyone went home to save the people.’
‘What’, he said, ‘was the purpose of fighting for an empty land?’ Similarly,
Iftin Hussein, a former shifta from Garissa explained that to prevent the
killing of animals, the shifta ceased their fight.
The State of Emergency, declared on  December , brought the
Preservation of Public Security (North-Eastern Region) Regulations into
effect. Under the terms of these regulations, a five-mile ‘prohibited zone’ was
established along the entire Kenya-Somali border. Any person found within
the prohibited zone without the necessary permission and pass was liable for
imprisonment. In order to enforce the measure ‘police authorities’, defined as
any person authorised by law to exercise police powers, were sanctioned to
enter, search, and seize without warrant any property or vehicle that was
deemed to be suspicious. If individuals failed to stop on police request while
within the zone, they were deemed guilty of an offence and the ‘police’ were
empowered to use firearms to assist in their arrest. An arrest within the
prohibited zone could lead to detention without trial for  days. In effect,
the regulations legitimised the use of lethal police force against any person
found within the prohibited zone, irrespective of who that person was.
The legislation was amended in September . This amendment not
only widened the areas affected by security legislation to include Isiolo and
Marsabit districts in Eastern Region, and Tana River and Lamu districts in
Coast Region, but also the scope of legitimate military and police action.
First, the term ‘Police Officer’ was amended to reference all administrative
personnel, making the civil administration part of the security apparatus.
Second, and building upon measures already established under the 
legislation, the whole of NER and its contiguous districts were deemed a
‘prescribed area’, within which any person could be arrested without warrant,
buildings or structures could be destroyed if they were considered connected
to suspicious persons, and livestock or property could be seized from any
person suspected of committing a crime. There was a final revision in .
Under the Preservation of Public Security Act, North Eastern and
 Interviews with Fugich Dabassa, Abdub Galgallo, and Dahir Hajj.
 Interviews with Jillo Golicha, Wario Tadicha, and Bashir Dere; Interview with
Guyo Galgallo, Garba Tulla,  Dec. ; Interview with Faisal Abdikadir, Garissa, 
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Contiguous Districts Regulations, the five-mile ‘prohibited zone’ was
extended to  miles, and all adults residing in shifta-affected areas were
required to register and carry an identity card. This culminated in the
implementation of a programme of forced villagisation, announced in June.
By this time, similarities between the Kenyan government’s anti-shifta
strategy, and the British campaign against Mau Mau during the previous
decade were abundant. Anti-Mau Mau measures included the use of curfew
orders and movement regulations, property confiscations, screening exercises,
the issuing of documentation and passes, detention without trial, and the
creation of concentrated villages. Similarly, during the shifta conflict, all
those living in shifta-affected areas were required to register and carry identity
papers, curfew orders and movement restrictions were in operation, security
forces could arrest and detain any person without warrant for  days, and all
persons were required to live within designated government villages, where
screening exercises were used to establish any potential connections between
civilians and shifta. Indeed, many of those involved in the implementation of
security measures during shifta had personal experience of British anti-Mau
Mau measures. This included many of Kenya’s postcolonial political elite,
but also members of the provincial administration who were stationed in
northern Kenya during the shifta conflict. Certainly, during parliamentary
debates regarding the use of emergency regulations in northern Kenya,
politicians drew directly on precedents set by the British during Mau Mau.
When the initial State of Emergency that had been declared in December
 expired in February , the MP for Trans-Nzoia constituency,
Masinde Muliro, declared to parliament that: ‘When we had the Emergency
in Kenya, all of the Kikuyu, whether they were Mau Mau or Loyalist, or
whoever they were, had to have a pass. They were rounded up, locked in
concentration camps, and some people were humiliated.’ Muliro then asked
the House to consider whether the government should round up all of the
Somalis in northern Kenya and place them in detention camps. The opinion
of the House was clear. They responded with cries of ‘yes, yes’.
Under the terms of the emergency regulations in operation in northern
Kenya, and by , a precedent was also set for the implementation of
collective responsibility for shifta activity. Curfew orders were used to
regulate movement and were justified as a means to facilitate police and army
operations. Local administrative officers could order a seizure of stock if
 KNA BB//, ‘Aide memoir: shifta operations’,  Jun. .
 KNA BB//, Permanent Secretary in the Office of the President to Provincial
Commissioners Eastern Province, North Eastern Province, and Coast Province, Reference
GEN.///A,  Jun. . For details of the villagisation programme see H.
Whittaker, ‘Forced villagization during the shifta conflict in Kenya, c. –’,
International Journal of African Historical Studies, : (forthcoming, ).
 For details of the British anti-Mau Mau campaign, see D. Anderson, Histories of
the Hanged: Britain’s The Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire (London, );
C. Elkins, Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain’s Gulag in Kenya
(New York, ).  Branch makes this point in Kenya, .
 Hansard, Republic of Kenya: House of Representatives Official Volume II, December
– March , (Nairobi,  Feb. ), Cols. –.
 For example see KNA BB//, Isiolo to Marsabit and Moyale, Ref. EN/, 
Dec. .
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security forces made a shifta contact and it was suspected that they had been
given assistance from the local population. Stock seizures were also enforced
after landmine incidents, since Kenyan security forces reckoned that
landmines could not be planted by shifta without the collusion of local
residents. By these measures, shifta-affected areas were divided into zones of
clan responsibility, and any incident that took place within a particular zone
was deemed the responsibility of the clan section residing there.The overall
intention of stock seizures in these contexts was to reduce civilian support for
shifta through communal punishment.
At the same time, stock seizures were also used as a means to control local
tensions and conflicts that were not a direct consequence of the movement for
secession; such seizures were a way of asserting governmental power and
authority over the operation of the pastoral system in northern Kenya. In
June , several hundred head of cattle were seized from the Gabra in
Marsabit following a raid on the Samburu in which  Samburu had been
killed; the police believed that if they did not impose this punishment there
might be a complete breakdown of law and order in the area. In many
respects, this is a further example of how the Kenyan administration, which
had just achieved self-government, had internalised colonial practices. The
progressive application of the  Outlying District Ordinance, the 
Closed District Ordinance, and the  Special District Administration Act
had established a legal framework that attempted to regulate northern Kenya
in response to widespread inter-clan warfare. Non-resident travel to the NFD
was restricted, and ‘tribal areas’ were established for each of the resident
communities living there. Any violation of the Special District
Administration Act was punishable by either a livestock confiscation or a
prison sentence. Trespassing into the grazing area of a neighbouring clan
section was punished by a stock seizure of between  and  per cent of the
herd of the accused. In the s, stock was confiscated from individuals
who grazed their animals in illegal grazing zones, or if they were found
beyond the limits of a village during curfew hours: when a police patrol found
one hundred head of cattle being grazed by Borana herdsmen in a prescribed
area, they were all arrested and the cattle seized.
 KNA PC/GRS///, Regional Government Agent to Civil Secretary NER,
Ref. L&O.///Vol. I/,  Jul. .
 KNA BB//, Provincial Commissioner NER to District Commissioners Garissa,
Mandera, and Wajir, Ref. B.//(),  Feb. .
 KNA BB//, Assistant Superintendent of Police, Marsabit to Regional
Commissioner of Police, Eastern Region,  Jun. .
 A substantial scholarship has argued that independent Kenya did not effect a major
ideological or structural break with the colonial state: see for example W. R. Ochieng’ and
E. S. Atieno-Odhiambo, ‘On Decolonization’, in Ogot and Ochieng’ (eds.),
Decolonization, xiii.  Mburu, Bandits, .  Ibid. .
 See KNA DC/ISO// for enquiry cases.
 For example on  February , a Kenya army foot patrol seized over fifty head of
cattle and , sheep and goats that were being grazed in a non-specified area of Garissa.
See KNA PC/GRSSA///, Garissa to Nairobi, Ref. A./Vol. I//,  Feb. ;
KNA DC/ISO///, File reference A./B//,  Mar. .
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Underlying these actions, which seemed to target the very local people with
whom the Kenyan government sought to reach an accommodation, was a
convergence of civil and military measures based on an official conflation of
shifta activity and pastoralism. Implicit within this was an attempt to
permanently settle pastoral communities. This was a time when international
development experts understood pastoral development in terms of the
‘resettlement paradigm’, and efforts were being made to move pastoralists
into what were perceived to be more productive and secure ways of life
through sedentarisation. By regulating and restricting movement to and
from pasture areas, livestock keepers were left unable to properly care for their
herds, and through the application of communal punishment for shifta,
livestock holdings were systematically reduced. The campaign against
militant secessionism came to include measures that both hindered and
controlled the operation of the pastoral economy more broadly. Indeed,
according to northern Kenyans, the Kenyan government assumed that all of
the region’s people were shifta.
One of the most enduring consequences of the Kenyan government’s
counter-insurgency strategy was to ferment a feeling of victimisation among
northern Kenyans, who now attribute impoverishment and livestock losses
since the s to governmental action during shifta. Although impossible
to quantify without further investigation, other research that has been
conducted on the pastoral economy of northern Kenya has identified the
shifta conflict as a period of intensified destitution in the course of a more
general process of pastoral decline across the Horn of Africa. It is certainly
the case that since the shifta conflict, a process of sedentarisation in NFD
areas has been initiated, with the populations of village and district centres
increasing.Likewise, there has been a rise in the number of people engaged
in settled economic activities, such as petty trade and farming. Yet, while
 D.M. Anderson, ‘Rehabilitation, resettlement, and restocking: ideology and practice
in pastoralist development’, in D.M. Anderson and V. Broch-Due (eds.), The Poor Are
Not Us: Poverty and Pastoralism (Oxford, ), .
 Interview with Abdo Barre. This memory is also recounted in numerous statements
given to the Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission, when it visited North Eastern
and Upper Eastern Regions (formally part of the NFD) during April and May . See
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC), NEP Special Pull-out (Nairobi,
August ), (http://www.tjrckenya.org/images/documents/NEP-pullout-.pdf).
 This was a common sentiment expressed to me by the informants of this research.
The accusation was repeated to the Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission, by a
former Council Chairman of Garissa, Dubat Ali Amey in April . He stated that
because of government action during the s, ‘the state pushed the area and its residents
into destitution. . .animals were confiscated and their meat ferried to the Kenya Meat
Commission’. TJRC, NEP, .
 R. Hogg, ‘The new pastoralism: poverty and dependency in northern Kenya’,
Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, : (), –.
 A trend in movement towards urban areas was first reported during  in Isiolo
and Wajir districts. KNA DC/ISO///, Isiolo District Monthly Report for Aug. ;
KNA PC/GRSSA///, Wajir District Monthly Report for Sep. .
 Interview with Faisal Abdikadir; Interview with Edin Mursal, Garissa,  Dec.
.
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many northern Kenyans have diversified economically, they remain com-
mitted to the pastoral ideal.
CONCLU S I O N
The analysis of postcolonial state formation in Africa cannot begin at the
moment of independence. A growing literature has identified structural
determinants of the Kenyan state that were inherited from the colonial era. In
the case of the shifta conflict, the postcolonial Kenyan state inherited its
problematic relationship with its northern borderland, and pursued policies
that were grounded in the experiences of colonial rule. This is illustrated by a
comparison of the emergency regulations enacted during MauMau and those
adopted by the independent Kenyan government to combat the shifta
insurgency, and by the measures taken by the colonial and postcolonial state
to regulate and control the pastoral economy in northern Kenya. During the
shifta conflict, the participation of local groups in nationalist insurgency
activity and organised livestock stealing resulted in the convergence of the two
strategies for dealing with insecurity. Consequently, comprehensive govern-
ment action was not only taken against shifta insurgents, but all northern
Kenyan pastoralists. This is one of the first examples of what Branch calls the
‘fetishization of order’ in postcolonial Kenya, the often violent discrediting of
those who dissent from state-led development policies. The relationship
between northern Kenya and the Kenyan state was thus recast during the
shifta conflict, from one of relative colonial disengagement, to one of state
ascendancy and penetration, with lasting implications. The North Eastern
Region was administered under the terms of the  Regulations until ,
when it was finally repealed, largely in response to international pressure
following accusations from Africa Watch and Amnesty International of state-
sponsored violence in the area during the s. Furthermore, while the
residents of northern Kenya are positive about the increase in the provision of
schooling in the region since the end of the shifta conflict, they still blame the
Kenyan government for impoverishment and livestock loss. The reluctance of
government authorities to consider compensation for losses incurred by
northern Kenyans during the conflict, stipulated in the  Indemnity Act,
only serves to heighten a sense of alienation from state authorities. It remains
to be seen how the work of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation
Commission, which was established in  in response to violent conflict
 Interview with Darmi Omar and Sallo Ramata, Garba Tulla,  Dec. ;
Interviews with Guyo Galgallo, Adan Banchalle, Fugich Dabassa, and Bashir Dere.
 M. Doornbos, ‘The African state in academic debate: retrospect and prospect’,
Journal of Modern African Studies, : (), .  Branch, Kenya, .
 The Regulations were repealed under Legal Notice No. ,  Nov. . Repeal
of the regulations also coincided with the introduction of multi-party politics in Kenya,
and can therefore be seen as a political ploy by the government to win political support
from northern Kenyans in the face of impending elections. See K. M’Inoti, ‘Beyond the
“emergency” in the North Eastern Province: an analysis of the use and abuse of emergency
powers’, The Nairobi Law Monthly,  (), –.
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that followed disputed elections in December , and the subsequent
passing of the Indemnity (Repeal) Act by parliament in February ,
which gives northern Kenyans the right to seek redress for unlawful acts
committed by public officers and members of the armed forces between 
December  and  February , will affect relations between people in
this peripheral region and the Kenyan state.
 Kenya Gazette Supplement No. (Bills No. ), The Indemnity (Repeal) Bill, ,
 Feb. .
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